Instructional Materials on Rhetoric

THREE CONTEXTS in which argumentation takes place:

Political speaking urges us either to do or not to do something: one of these two courses is always taken by private counselors, as well as by men who address public assemblies. Forensic speaking either attacks or defends somebody: one or other of these two things must always be done by the parties in a case. The epideictic speech either praises or blames somebody. These three kinds of rhetoric refer to three different kinds of time. The political orator deliberates and makes decisions with reference to the future. The forensic orator is concerned with the past: one accuses the other, and the other defends himself, with reference to things already done. The epideictic speech maker is, properly speaking, concerned with the present, since all praise or blame in view of the state of things existing at the time. (Aristotle, from RHETORIC)

To which of the three contexts do the following statements belong?

TYPES OF ARGUMENT for Political Rhetoric:

You hold your proposal advisable because it is:

You support your point through argument by:

What is Martin Luther King arguing FOR in "Letter from Birmingham Jail"?

"Is he justified in organizing illegal protest gatherings in Alabama at this time."

(This is a much more specific, limited question than the whole issue of racism itself.)

Six objections are made by his opponents:

- it is not his home state
- it is not advantageous
- it is not the right time yet
- it is illegal
- it causes violence, social disturbance
- it is "extreme," excessive

King extensively answers all six, in the same order as above.

The responses to these objection form the outline of his letter.

General TOPICS OF RHETORIC:

a. Definition
b. Genus and Species
c. Adjuncts
d. Contraries
e. Degree, greater, equal, less
f. Cause, material, instrumental, efficient
g. Origin / Genesis
h. Quotation / Testimony

Special TOPICS OF RHETORIC for an ISSUE ANALYSIS

1. JURISDICTION

2. INTERESTED / AFFECTED PARTIES

3. POINTS IN QUESTION

4. ARGUMENTS

GROUNDS FOR REFUTATION of an opponent's argument:

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3) Readings on RHETORIC (Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, Erasmus)

From RHETORIC.

By Aristotle, c. 350 B.C..

(trans. W. Rhys Roberts)

We must be able to employ persuasion, just as strict reasoning can be employed, on opposite sides of a question, not in order that we may in practice employ it in both ways (for we must not make people believe what is wrong), but in order that we may see clearly what the facts are, and that, if another man argues unfairly, we on our part may be able to confute him. No other of the arts draws opposite conclusions: dialectic and rhetoric alone do this. Both these arts draw opposite conclusions impartially. Nevertheless, the underlying facts do not lend themselves equally well to the contrary views. No, things that are true and things that are better are, by their nature, practically always easier to prove and easier to believe in. Again, it is absurd to hold that a man ought to be ashamed of being unable to defend himself with his limbs, but not of being unable to defend himself with speech and reason, when the use of rational speech is more distinctive of a human being than the use of his limbs. And if it be objected that one who uses such power of speech unjustly might do great harm, that is a charge which may be made in common against all good things except virtue, and above all against the things that are most useful, as strength, health, wealth, generalship. A man can confer the greatest benefits by a right use of these, and inflict the greatest of injuries by using them wrongly.

It is clear, then, that rhetoric is not bound up with a single definite class of subjects, but is as universal as dialectic; it is clear, also, that it is useful. It is clear, further, that its function is not simply to succeed in persuading, but rather to discover the means of coming as near such success as the circumstances of each particular case allow. In this it resembles all other arts. For example, it is not the function of medicine simply to make a man quite healthy, but to put him as far as may be on the road to health; it is possible to give excellent treatment even to those who can never enjoy sound health. Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion. This is not a function of any other art. Every other art can instruct or persuade about its own particular subject matter; for instance, medicine about what is healthy and unhealthy, geometry about the properties of magnitudes, arithmetic about numbers, and the same is true of the other arts and sciences. But rhetoric we look upon as the power of observing the means of persuasion on almost any subject presented to us; and that is why we say that, in its technical character, it is not concerned with any special or definite class of subjects.

Political speaking urges us either to do or not to do something: one of these two courses is always taken by private counselors, as well as by men who address public assemblies. Legal speaking either attacks or defends somebody: one or other of these two things must always be done by the parties in a case. The epideictic, or moral speech either praises or blames somebody. These three kinds of rhetoric refer to three different kinds of time. The political orator deliberates and makes decisions with reference to the future. The forensic orator is concerned with the past: one accuses the other, and the other defends himself, with reference to things already done. The epideictic speech maker is, properly speaking, concerned with the present, since all praise or blame in view of the state of things existing at the time.

Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself. Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. This kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of this character before he begins to speak. It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses. Secondly, persuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions. Our judgements when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile. It is towards producing these effects, as we maintain, that present-day writers on rhetoric direct the whole of their efforts. This subject shall be treated in detail when we come to speak of the emotions. Thirdly, persuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question. There are, then, these three means of effecting persuasion: 1) to understand human character and goodness in their various forms; 2) to understand the emotions -- that is, to name them and describe them, to know their causes and the way in which they are excited; and 3) to reason logically.

From OF INVENTION.

By Marcus Tullius Cicero, 85 A.D.

(trans. H. M Hubbell, Loeb editions)

The mind will more easily come upon inventions if one examines frequently and carefully one's own narrative of the events and that of the opponent, and, eliciting any clues that each part may afford, ponders why, with what intent and with what hope of success each thing was done; why it was done in this way rather than in that; why by this man rather than by that; why with no helper or why with this one; why no one knew about it, or why some one did, and why it was this one who did; why another act was performed earlier; why another act was not performed earlier; why this was done in immediate connection with the event, and this other thing after the event; whether this was done intentionally or followed as a natural consequence of the event; whether what he said is consistent with the events or with itself; whether this is a sign of this or of that, or both of this and of that and of which the more; what was done that ought not to have been done, or what was left undone that ought to have been done. When the mind studies so attentively every part of the whole affair, then the topics mentioned above which are stored up will come forth of their own accord; and then sometimes from one, sometimes from a combination of topics definite arguments will be produced, part of which will be classed as probable and part as irrefutable.

Every speech whether epideictic, deliberative or forensic must turn on one or more of the "issues" described in the first book. Now, let us begin with the conjectural issue (or issue of fact), and let the following be taken as an example. On a highway a traveler joined himself to another who was on a business trip and had with him a considerable sum of money. As is natural, they fell into conversation as they went along, and the result was that they were ready to make the trip together as close friends. Therefore on stopping at the same inn, they planned to dine together and sleep in the same apartment. After dinner they went to bed in the same room. Then the innkeeper -- for it is said the truth was found out when he had been caught in another crime -- who had taken note of one of the travelers, that is the one with the money, came in the dead of night when he knew that they were sleeping heavily as people do when tired, drew the sword of the one who did not have the money -- it was lying by his side -- killed the other man, took his money, replaced the blood-stained sword in its sheath and went back to his own bed. Long before dawn the man whose sword had been used to commit the murder, got up and called his companion again and again. Deciding that he did not answer because he was sound asleep, the traveler took his sword and the rest of his belongings and set out alone. Not long afterward the innkeeper pursues him, seizes him, draws the sword from its sheath and finds it stained with blood. The fellow is brought to the city and accused of the crime. In this case the charge is, "You committed this murder;" the answer is, "I did not." From this arises the issue, that is the question, the same in the conjectural issue as the point for the judge's decision, "Did he commit murder?"

When there is a dispute about the name by which an act is described, the issue is known as the issue of definition, because the meaning of the word must be defined; we may take the following case as an example of this class: Gaius Flaminius -- the one who as consul conducted an unsuccessful campaign in the Second Punic War -- when tribune of the people seditiously proposed an agrarian law to the people against the wishes of the senate and in general contrary to the desires of all the upper classes. As he was haranguing the popular assembly, his father dragged him from the rostrum and was then charged with contempt of court. The charge is, "You committed contempt of court in that you dragged a tribune of the people from the rostrum." The answer is: "I did not commit contempt of court." The question is, "Did he commit contempt of court?" The excuse is, "I used the authority which I had over my son." The denial of the excuse, "On the contrary, one who uses the authority belonging to him as a father -- that is, private authority -- to lessen the authority of a tribune -- that is, the authority of the public -- is guilty of contempt of court." The point for the judge's decision is, "Would he be guilty of contempt of court, who used his authority as father against the authority of a tribune?" All arguments must be directed to this point.

Certain principles either obvious or obscure to us have by reason of advantage passed into custom; afterward certain principles approved by custom or deemed to be really advantageous have been confirmed by statute. And the law of nature is something which is implanted in us not by opinion, but by a kind of innate instinct; it includes religion, duty, gratitude, revenge, reverence, and truth. Religion is the term applied to the fear and worship of the gods. Duty warns us to keep our obligations to our country or parents or other kin. Gratitude has regard for remembering and returning services, honour, and acts of friendship. Revenge is the act through which be defending or avenging we repel violence and insult from ourselves and from those who ought to be dear to us, and by which we punish offenses. Reverence is the act by which we show respect to and cherish our superiors in age or wisdom or honour or any high position. Truth is the quality by which we endeavour to avoid any discrepancy between our statements and facts, past, present or future. The rights of nature may frequently be brought in for a comparison or to enlarge on some topic.

Virtue may be defined as a habit of mind in harmony with reason and the order of nature. Therefore when we have become acquainted with all its parts we shall have considered the full scope of honour, pure and simple. It has four parts: wisdom, justice, courage, temperance.

Wisdom is the knowledge of what is good, what is bad, and what is neither good nor bad. Its parts are memory, intelligence, and foresight.

Memory is the faculty by which the mind recalls what has happened. Intelligence is the faculty by which it ascertains what is. Foresight is the faculty by which it is seen that something is going to occur before it occurs.

Justice is a habit of mind which gives every man his desert while preserving the common advantage. Its first principles proceed from nature, then certain rules of conduct became customary by reason of their advantage; later still both the principles that proceeded from nature and those that had been approved by custom received the support of religion and the fear of the law.

Courage is the quality by which one undertakes dangerous tasks and endures hardships. Its parts are highmindedness, confidence, patience, perseverance. Highmindedness consists in the contemplation and execution of great and sublime projects with a certain grandeur and magnificence of imagination. Confidence is the quality by which in important and honourable undertakings the spirit has placed great trust in itself with a resolute hope of success. Patience is a willing and sustained endurance of difficult and arduous tasks for a noble and useful end. Perseverance is a firm and abiding persistence in a well-considered plan of action.

Temperance is a firm and well-considered control exercised by the reason over lust and other improper impulses of the mind. Its parts are continence, clemency, and modesty. Continence is the control of desire by the guidance of wisdom. Clemency is a kindly and gentle restraint of spirits that have been provoked to dislike of a person of inferior rank. Modesty is a sense of shame or decency which secures observance and firm authority for what is honourable. All these qualities are desirable for their own sake, though no profit be connected with them.

There are then many things that attract us not only by their intrinsic worth but also by the advantage to be derived from them; this class includes glory, rank, influence, and friendship. Glory consists in a person's having a widespread reputation accompanied by praise. Rank is the possession of a distinguished office which merits respect, honour, and reverence. Influence is a fulness of power, dignity, or resources of some sort. Friendship is a desire to do good to some one simply for the benefit of the person whom one loves, with a requital of the feeling on his part. Since we are here discussing speeches about public issues, we associate friendship with benefits to be derived from it, so that it may seem desirable because of these as well as for its own sake. I say this that I may not perhaps be taken to task by those who think I am speaking of every kind of friendship. As a matter of fact there are some who think that friendship is to be sought solely for advantage, others, for itself alone, and others for itself and for advantage. Which opinion has the best foundation is a matter to be considered at another time. For the present let it be left thus as far as oratorical practice is concerned, that friendship is to be sought for both reasons.

Advantage lies either in the body or in things outside the body. By far the largest part of external advantages, however, results in advantage of the body. For example, in the state there are some things that, so to speak, pertain to the body politic, such as fields, harbours, money, a fleet, sailors, soldiers and allies -- the means by which states preserve their safety and liberty -- and other things contribute something grander and less necessary, such as the great size and surpassing beauty of a city, an extraordinary amount of money and a multitude of friendships and alliances. These things not only make states safe and secure, but also important and powerful. Therefore, there seem to be two parts of advantage -- security and power. Security is a reasoned and unbroken maintenance of safety. Power is the possession of resources sufficient for preserving one's self and weakening another. Moreover, it is proper to inquire in connection with all these things that have been mentioned above, what can be done and what can easily be done. We shall call easy anything which can be accomplished in the shortest possible time without great or without any exertion, expense or trouble. A task is said to be possible which although it requires exertion, expense, trouble or long-continued effort and presents every reason for considering it difficult, or at least the most or greatest reasons, can nevertheless, if these difficulties are faced, be accomplished and brought to an end.

Now that we have discussed honour and advantage there remain to be described the qualities that go with these, namely necessity and affection. I regard necessity as something that no force can resist and thereby one is prevented from accomplishing some possible task; and this necessity cannot be altered or alleviated. To make the matter plainer, we may use an illustration to show the nature and extent of its influence. It is necessary that anything made of wood is capable of being consumed by fire. It is necessary that a mortal body die at some time or other. And it is necessary in the way that the force of necessity, which we just now described, requires.

When necessities of this sort come up in planning a speech, they are rightly called necessities; but if other matters arise that are merely difficult we shall consider them under the question discussed above: Can it be done? Furthermore, I seem to see that there are some necessities with qualifications and some that are simple and absolute. For example, we use the word in one sense when we say: "It is necessary for the people of Casilinum to surrender to Hannibal," but in a different sense when we say: "It is necessary for Casilinum to fall into the power of Hannibal." In the first case there is this qualification: "Unless they prefer to die of starvation." For if they prefer that, it is not necessary to surrender. But in the second statement the case is not the same, because whether the people of Casilinum choose to surrender or to face starvation and so perish, it is necessary that Casilinum fall into the power of Hannibal.

What can be accomplished by such a distinction between different kinds of necessity? I might say, a great deal, when it seems likely that the subject of necessity will come up. For when the necessity is simple there is no reason for saying a great deal since it is utterly impossible to modify it. When, however, we use the word necessary meaning thereby that an act is necessary if we wish to avoid or gain something, then we must consider to what extent that qualification is advantageous or honourable. For if you would observe, under condition, however, that you seek the thing that will conduce to the advantage of the state, you would find that there is nothing which must be done except for some reason which we call the qualification. In the same way there are many acts of necessity for which there is no similar qualification. In this class is the statement that mortal men must die, without qualification. It is not necessary for them to eat, except with the qualification, "Unless they prefer to die of starvation."

Therefore, as I say, the nature of the qualification must always be examined. For it will always be pertinent to the extent that the necessity has to be explained either with reference to honour in this way: "It is necessary if we wish to live honourably," or with reference to security in this way, "It is necessary if we wish to be secure," or with reference to convenience in this way, "It is necessary if we wish to live without inconvenience."

The greatest necessity is that of doing what is honourable; next to that is the necessity of security and third and last the necessity of convenience: this can never stand comparison with the other two. It is often necessary to weigh these, one against the other, so that, although honour is superior to security, it may be a question which it is preferable to follow. In this matter it seems possible to give a fixed and universal rule. For one should take thought for security in a case in which though honour is lost for the moment while consulting security, it may be recovered in the future by courage and diligence. If this is not possible, one should take thought for honour. So in a case of this sort, too, when we seem to consult our security, we shall be able to say with truth that we are concerned about honour, since without security we can never attain to honour. In such circumstances it will be proper to yield to another, or to meet another's terms, or to keep quiet for the present and await another opportunity, provided only that some attention is paid to the question whether this cause which conduces to our advantage is worth a loss in glory and honour.

The main thing under this head seems to me to be the question what the thing is which makes some action necessary for us if we wish to acquire or avoid it; in other words, what is the qualification -- in order that we may expend our energies in harmony with the real state of affairs, and may judge the most important reason in each case to be the most overwhelmingly necessary.

From INSTITUTIO ORATORIA.

By Marcus Quintilian, 90 A.D.

(Trans. H. E. Butler, Loeb editions)

What then? -- I am asked -- will not a builder speak better on the subject of building and a musician on music?

Certainly, if the orator does not know what is the question at issue. Even an illiterate peasant who is party to a suit will speak better on behalf of his case than an orator who does not know what the subject in dispute may be.

But on the other hand, if the orator receive instruction from the builder or the musician, he will put forward what he has thus learned better than either, just as a lawyer will plead a case better than his client, once he has been instructed in it. The builder and the musician will, however, speak on the subject of their respective arts, if there should be any technical point which requires to be established. Neither will be an orator, but he will perform his task like an orator, just as when an untrained person binds up a wound, he will not be a physician, but he will be acting as one. We are therefore right in asserting that the material of rhetoric is composed of everything that comes before the orator for treatment.

There are four different methods which may be employed in every case, and he who is going to plead should study them as first essentials. For, to begin with the defendant, far the strongest method of self-defense is, if possible, to deny the charge. The second best is when it is possible to reply that the particular act with which you are charged was never committed. The third and most honourable is to maintain that the act was justifiable. If none of these lines of defense is feasible, there remains the last and only hope of safety: we must evade the charge with the aid of some point of law, making it appear that the action has been brought against us illegally.

I must set forth the function of the exordium, the method of the statement of facts, the cogency of proofs, whether we are confirming our own assertion or refuting those of our opponents, and the force of the peroration, whether we have to refresh the memory of the judge by a brief recapitulation of the facts, or to do what is far more effective, stir his emotions.

The sole purpose of the exordium is to prepare our audience in such a way that they will be disposed to lend a ready ear to the rest of our speech. The majority of authors agree that this is best effected in three ways, by making the audience well-disposed, attentive and ready to receive instruction.

The statement of facts consists in the persuasive exposition of that which either has been done, or is supposed to have been done, or, to quote the definition given by Apollodorus, is a speech instructing the audience as to the nature of the case in dispute. . . . it should be lucid, brief and plausible . . . . If at this stage of the proceedings he fails to understand, remember or believe what we say, our labour is but lost in the remainder of the speech. We shall achieve lucidity and clearness in our statement of facts, first by setting forth our story in words which are appropriate, significant and free from any taint of meanness, but not on the other hand farfetched or unusual, and secondly by giving a distinct account of facts, persons, times, places and causes.

After the statement of facts some place the proposition.

Sometimes the proposition is highly advantageous, more especially when the fact cannot be defended and the question turns on the definition of the fact; as for example in the case of the man who has taken the money of a private individual from a temple: we shall say, "My client is charged with sacrilege. It is for you to decide whether it was sacrilege," so that the judge may understand that his sole duty is to decide whether the charge is tantamount to sacrilege.

The peroration which some call the completion and others the conclusion . . . may deal either with facts or the emotional aspect of the case. The repetition and grouping of the facts . . . the enumeration, serves both to refresh the memory of the judge and to place the whole of the case before his eyes [at once] and, even although the facts may have made little impression on him in detail, their cumulative effect is considerable. This final recapitulation must be as brief as possible and . . . we must summarize the facts under the appropriate heads. For if we devote too much time thereto, the peroration will cease to be an enumeration and will constitute something very like a second speech. On the other hand the points selected for enumeration must be treated with weight and dignity, enlivened by apt reflections and diversified by suitable figures; for there is nothing more tiresome than a dry repetition of facts, which merely suggests a lack of confidence in the judges' memory.

Appeals to emotion are necessary if there are no other means for securing the victory of truth, justice and the public interest.

In the peroration we have to consider what the feelings of the judge will be when he retires to consider his verdict, for we shall have no further opportunity to say anything and cannot any longer reserve arguments to be produced later.

Let us now turn to consider the 'places' of arguments . . . in the sense of the secret places where arguments reside, and from which they must be drawn forth.

Firstly, then, arguments may be drawn from persons; for, as I have said, all arguments fall into two classes, those concerned with things and those concerned with persons, since causes, time, place, occasion, instruments, means and the like are all accidents of things. I have no intention of tracing all the accidents of persons, as many have done, but shall confine myself to those from which arguments may be drawn. Such are birth, for persons are generally regarded as having some resemblance to their parents and ancestors, a resemblance which sometimes leads to their living disgracefully or honourably, as the case may be; then there is nationality, for races have their own character, and the same action is not probable in the case of a barbarian, a Roman and a Greek; country is another, for there is a like diversity in the laws, institutions and opinions of different states; sex, since for example a man is more likely to commit a robbery, a woman to poison; age, since different actions suit different ages; education and training, since it makes a great difference who were the instructors and what the method of instruction in each individual case; bodily constitution, for beauty is often introduced as an argument for lust, strength as an argument for insolence, and their opposites for opposite conduct; fortune, since the same acts are not to be expected from rich and poor, or from one who is surrounded by troops of relations, friends or clients and one who lacks all these advantages; condition, too, is important, for it makes a great difference whether a man be famous or obscure, a magistrate or a private individual, a father or a son, a citizen or a foreigner, a free man or a slave, married or unmarried, a father or childless. Nor must we pass by natural disposition, for avarice, anger, pity, cruelty, severity and the like may often be adduced to prove the credibility or the reverse of a given act; it is for instance often asked whether a man's way of living be luxurious, frugal or parsimonious. Then there is occupation, since a rustic, a lawyer, a man of business, a soldier, a sailor, a doctor all perform very different actions. We must also consider the personal ambitions of individuals, for instance whether they wish to be thought rich or eloquent, just or powerful. Past life and previous utterances are also a subject for investigation, since we are in the habit of inferring the present from the past. To these some add passion, by which they mean some temporary emotion such as anger or fear; they also add design, which may refer to the past, present or future. These latter, however, although accidents of persons, should be referred to that class of arguments which we draw from causes, as also should certain dispositions of mind, for example when we inquire whether one man is the friend or enemy of another.

In regard to every action the question arises either Why or Where or When or How or By what means the action is performed.

Well, then, to give a brief summary of the whole question, arguments are drawn from persons, causes, place and time (which latter we have divided into preceding, contemporary and subsequent), from resources (under which we include instruments), from manner (that is, how a thing has been done), from definition, genus, species, difference, property, elimination, division, beginnings, increase, consummation, likes, unlikes, contradictions, consequents, efficients, effects, results, and comparison, which is subdivided into several species.

In insisting on our strongest arguments we must take them singly, whereas our weaker arguments should be massed together: for it is undesirable that those arguments which are strong in themselves should have their force obscured by the surrounding matter, since it is important to show their true nature: on the other hand arguments which are naturally weak will receive mutual support if grouped together. The further question has been raised as to whether the strongest arguments should be placed first, to take possession of the judge's mind, or last, to leave an impression on it; or whether they should be divided between the commencement and close of the proof, adopting the Homeric disposition of placing the weakest in the center of the column, so that they may derive strength from their neighbours.

From ON COPIA OF WORDS AND IDEAS

Erasmus Desiderius ("Erasmus of Rotterdam")

(Trans. Donald D. King and H. David Rix)

I -- Concerning the Methods of Embellishing

The first way to embellish thought is to relate at length and treat in detail something that could be expressed summarily and in general. And this, in fact, is the same as if one should display merchandise first through a latticework, or rolled up in carpets, then should unroll the carpets and disclose the merchandise, exposing it completely to sight. An example of this method follows:

"He lost everything through excess."

This expression, complete in itself, and, as it were, all rolled up, may be developed by enumerating a great many kinds of possessions, and by setting forth various ways of losing property:

Whatever had come by inheritance from father or mother, whatever had come by death of other relatives, whatever had been added from his wife's dowry, which was not at all mean, whatever had accrued from bequests (and considerable had accrued), whatever he had received from the liberality of his prince, whatever private property he had procured, all money, military equipment, clothes, estates, fields, together with farms and herds, in short, everything, whether movable or real estate, and finally even his immediate household property, in a short time he so consumed, wasted, and devoured in foulest passion for harlots, in daily banquets, in sumptuous entertainments, nightly drinking bouts, low taverns, delicacies, perfumes, dice, and gaming that what remained to him would not equal a farthing.

In this case the words "everything" and "he lost by excess" are developed in detail. We will add yet another. There survives a most appropriate example of this method in Lucian, in the "Harmonides". For although he could have summarily said, "I have learned the whole art of flute playing," he preferred to display copia by developing details in this manner:

You have taught me how to play the flute correctly, and to blow on the mouthpiece lightly, as it were, and with harmony, then, with skilled and facile touch to use my fingers in frequent raising and lowering of the tone; moreover, you have taught me to keep time and, furthermore, to note what is proper to any type of harmony, the divine impetus of the phrygian, the bacchic fury of the lydian, the sobriety and restraint of the doric, the cheerfulness of the ionic, so that the modes harmonize with the dance.

In this connection I should not think it out of place to make this suggestion, that a general statement of the subject be placed at the beginning and that the same be then repeated in another form of speech, and that finally you should return to the general statement as though at last wearied of enumerating details, even though nothing has been omitted.

Moreover, we must be careful not to confuse the regular succession of details with a chaotic mass of words, and we must take care not to make everything topsy-turvy, so that we do not accumulate an unmanageable multitude of words, wholly lacking in charm, but do prevent the boredom of our hearer or reader by skillful arrangement, or fitting distribution, or elegant description.

The second method of varying is closely related to the first. Whenever we are not content to set forth briefly the conclusion of a matter, allowing the various things that lead up to it to be understood of themselves, we relate them one by one. The following will serve as an example of this precept:

"Cicero suppressed the undertakings of Catiline."

You will enrich this thus:

The nefarious undertakings of Catiline, who with the aid of the most abandoned young men plotted the destruction and extermination of the whole Roman state, Marcus Tullius Cicero, Consul, straightway suspected by his sagacity, investigated with singular vigilance, apprehended with greatest good judgment, revealed with wondrous zeal for the republic, proved clearly with incredible eloquence, put down with most weighty authority, destroyed with arms, abolished with great good fortune.

The next method of amplification concerns "evidentia," i.e., "description." We use this whenever, for the sake of amplifying, adorning, or pleasing, we do not state a thing simply, but set it forth to be viewed as though portrayed in colour on a tablet, so that it may seem that we have painted, not narrated, and that the reader has seen, not read.

If someone should say that a city was "captured," he doubtless comprehends in that general statement everything that attends such fortune, but if you develop what is implicit in the one word, flames will appear pouring through homes and temples; the crash of falling buildings will be heard, and one indefinable sound of diverse outcries; some will be seen in bewildered flight, others clinging in the last embrace of their relatives; there will be the wailing of infants and women, old people cruelly preserved by fate till that day, the pillaging of profane and sacred objects, the running about of those carrying off booty and those seeking it, prisoners on chains before their captors, and the mother struggling to keep her infant, and fighting among the victors wherever there is greater plunder.

For although the overflow of a city involves all these things, it is nevertheless less effective to tell the whole at once than it is to relate all of the particulars. Likewise as illustration is this example from Caelius' "Against Antony":

For they found him sunk in a drunken stupor, snoring with all his might, repeatedly belching while the most beautiful of his dinner companions leaned toward him from all their various couches and the others lay about here and there half dead with fright; having learned of the approach of the enemy, they were trying to arouse Antony. In vain they were shouting his name and raising his head; one whispered gently in his ear while another slapped him forcibly. But whenever he became aware of their voice and touch, he sought to embrace the neck of the nearest. Having been aroused, he was unable to sleep, and being too drunk, he was unable to awaken, but was thrown about in a semiconscious sleep in the arms of his centurions and concubines.

Nothing, says Quintilian, could be painted more credibly than this, nor could any reproach be more forceful, nor anything be pictured more clearly.

The next method of enlarging is taken from circumstances. These have to do partly with things: cause, place, occasion, instrument, time, mode and so on; partly with persons, as: race, country, sex, age, education, culture, physical appearance, fortune, position, quality of mind, desire, experiences, temperament, understanding and name.

Timely and appropriate use of circumstances, moreover, has many advantages: first in amplifying and disparaging, about which we will speak briefly soon; then in vivid presentation, about which we spoke just above; and in addition, in confirmation and credibility. For it results in the whole speech being sown and fortified everywhere with close and frequent arguments, which although you do not develop, you lead forth, as it were, to the battle line; but they fight of themselves and help the cause not a little, so that, as it is possible for one, although he works in another field, to recognize, nevertheless, a man skillful combining of this kind.

II -- When Brevity rather than Copia is Desired

That person to whom laconic brevity in speech is pleasing, following the example of the Attics especially,

-will abstain from prefaces and appeals to emotion;

-will set forth his subject simply and cursorily;

-will not make use of every argument, but only the chief ones,

-and those, he will employ not developed at length, but compactly, so that there will be an argument implicit almost in each separate word if anyone wants to develop it.

The brief writer will be content to have instructed, not harangued.

He will abstain from amplifications, asseverations, similes, exempla, sententiae, epiphonemata, fabulae, apologues, allusions, and witty sayings, unless any of these is so necessary that it cannot possibly be omitted.

Likewise, he will avoid all figures that make a speech full, distinguished, pointed or ornamented, or pleasing. He will not treat the same subject in several different ways and he will set forth details in words so full of meaning that much more is understood than is heard, and one thing can be inferred from another.

On the other hand, he who pursues copia will be eager to amplify details, generally by the methods I have discussed.

III -- "What Should Be Avoided By Both"

But let each beware lest in striving for his goal he fall into the closely related vice, a thing that is commonly done. Let the lover of brevity see to it that he not do only this, i.e., say few things, but let him say the best possible things in the fewest words.

And he who is pleased by that Homeric expression, "few indeed," let him take pleasure in this also, which immediately follows, "and very acutely." And who approves "not verbose", should not overlook this also, which is added immediately, "not random in speech."

For nothing so suits brevity of speech as propriety and elegance, and if simplicity be added to this, obscurity (a vice which is wont to go hand in hand with the inclination to brevity) will be avoided. But here again care should be taken lest the speech be dull, since it is enlivened with no emotional appeals.

In the same way the subject should be so clearly presented that in itself it impresses on the mind some points that are not spoken aloud; in addition, it should be seasoned with every Attic charm. Special care should be taken that in our zeal for brevity we do not omit things that should be said.

On the other hand, he who seeks copia ought likewise to employ discrimination in his choice of words and subjects and figures, lest his reasons be futile; his examples, unsuitable; his sententiae, lifeless; his digressions, too long and too inappropriate; his figures, harsh and forced.

Accordingly, he ought to consider his method of arrangement and disposition of utmost importance, lest his whole speech be thrown into disorder and confused by an undigested mass of materials. And everywhere tedium should be lightened by variety, cheerfulness, and humor.

Also it should be pointed out that we do not strive for the same amount of copia everywhere. For in certain places it cannot be profitably employed.

But setting aside those places which by their nature do not admit of copia, we should select the especially fruitful and tractable parts, unless perchance to make a test or display of talent it is desired sometimes to make an elephant from a fly, as they say (just as Favorinus praised fever; and Sinesius, baldness; and as we have praised folly in an encomium, and the Aldine anchor in proverbs). Indulgence should be allowed in the classroom since youth naturally runs to excess. However, where it is not a question of schoolroom composition, but of a serious matter where risks are involved, there, a rhetor who is not foolish, having considered the matter, will judge the proper measure of copia from its usefulness to the case.

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